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ABSTRACT  
   
Public-Private Partnerships (P3) in North America have become a trend in the 
past two decades and are gaining attention in the transportation industry with 
some large scale projects being delivered by this approach. This is due to the need 
for alternative funding sources for public projects and for improved efficiency of 
these projects in order to save time and money. Several research studies have been 
done, including mature markets in Europe and Australia, on the cost and schedule 
performance of transportation projects but no similar study has been conducted in 
North America. This study focuses on cost and schedule performance of twelve 
P3 transportation projects during their construction phase, costing over $100 
million each, consisting of roads and bridges only with no signature tunnels. The 
P3 approach applied in this study is the Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintain 
(DBFOM) model and the results obtained are compared with similar research 
studies on North American Design-Build (DB) and Design-Bid-Build (DBB) 
projects. The schedule performance for P3 projects in this study was found to be   
-0.23 percent versus estimated as compared to the 4.34 percent for the DBB 
projects and 11.04 percent for the DB projects in the Shrestha study, indicating P3 
projects are completed in less time than other methods. The cost performance in 
this study was 0.81 percent for the P3 projects while in the Shrestha study the 
average cost increase for the four DB projects was found to be 1.49 percent while 
for the DBB projects it was 12.71 percent, again indicating P3 projects reduce 
cost compared to other delivery approaches. The limited number of projects 
available for this study does not allow us to draw an explicit conclusion on the 
ii 
performance of P3s in North America but paves the way for future studies to 
explore more data as it becomes available. However, the results in this study show 
that P3 projects have good cost and schedule adherence to the contract 
requirements. This study gives us an initial comparison of P3 performance with 
the more traditional approach and shows us the empirical benefits and limitations 
of the P3 approach in the highway construction industry. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
Highway construction in North America has mainly been developed by the 
traditional delivery methods such as Design-Bid-Build (DBB) and Design-Build 
(DB). These approaches have been successful to an extent but they are not 
meeting the current rapidly growing requirements with the required efficiency. 
The transportation industry is facing an infrastructure funding gap of $138 billion 
for 2008-2035 (National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing 
Commission, 2009). The motor-fuel and road taxes are not able to support the 
present demand for transportation infrastructure and hence transportation officials 
are looking for delivery methods that best utilize the existing funds and become a 
source of funds as well.  
The taxes in the US compared to the taxes in other countries could give us 
a picture of the current reduction in available funds through gasoline taxes in US. 
Figure 1 shows the vehicle fuel retail prices indicating the wholesale and 
distribution price and the taxes added to the gasoline price in the US and various 
countries. It shows that the taxes on gasoline in the US account for a very small 
percentage of the total retail price per liter of fuel compared to other countries. 
The European countries lead the way with taxes being more than the wholesale 
and distribution cost by about 200 percent for most of them. The graph in Figure 1 
is based on 2006 US dollars. 
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Figure 1. Vehicle Fuel Retail Prices (International Fuel Prices 2007) 
     Source: VTPI, Fuel Taxes: Increasing Fuel Taxes and Fees, 2011 
 The trend for gasoline taxes in the US has been fairly even for the past 
five decades (shown in Figure 2). Taxes are shown in 2004 US dollars per gallon.  
The total fuel costs have been rising significantly since 2003; however fuel taxes 
have been flat. Funds for construction of new transportation infrastructure depend 
highly on the taxes derived from fuel consumption in the US, and hence fuel taxes 
need to be in rationality with the rising need for new facilities and for operation 
and maintenance of existing ones. The requirement to increase fuel prices and its 
advantages are mentioned in the 2011 report by Victoria Transport Policy 
Institute (VTPI) on Fuel Taxes saying “Higher fuel prices encourage more 
efficient transportation and fuel conservation. For oil consuming nations, reduced 
fuel consumption reduces the economic costs of importing petroleum. For oil 
producing countries it leaves more product to export, increasing revenues and 
income. For all countries, reducing total vehicle mileage reduces costs such as 
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traffic congestion, road and parking facility costs, accident and pollution costs, 
helps maintain a diverse transportation system (walking, cycling and public 
transport), and reduces sprawl.” 
 
 
Figure 2. U.S. Fuel and Fuel Tax Cost Trends 
     Source: VTPI, Fuel Taxes: Increasing Fuel Taxes and Fees, 2011 
 Figure 3 shows the Highway Construction Price Index (HCPI) from 1956 
to 2007 – illustrating the rising demand for funding of transportation 
infrastructure in the US. The data for the graph is published by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and shows a considerable growth in the price index from 1956 
through 2007, taking the index value for 2009 to be 100. A steep increase in the 
HCPI is observed from 2003 to 2007, due to a rise in wages paid to the 
construction workers. This increase was also due to the increase in prices of 
materials used in highway construction. The price of petroleum rose by 21 
percent, which eventually led to a rise in prices of asphalt and diesel used in 
construction activities. Prices of iron and steel rose 13 percent annually. Sand, 
gravel, cement and concrete rose by 7 percent each year, architectural and 
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structural metal prices rose by 6 percent. The overall costs of highway and road 
construction increased at a pace of 10 percent annually from 2003 to 2007 
compared to 2.4 percent increase in the two decades preceding 2003 (CBO, 
2010). 
 
Figure 3. Highway Construction Price Index, 1956 to 2007 
    Source: CBO, 2010 
According to the report by Robert A. Sunshine, Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO, October 2007), the rise in highway construction cost from 2003 to 
2007 more than offsets an increase in nominal spending on these facilities with 
spending in constant dollar falling by an average of 1.6 percent per year. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4 with the trend of constant dollars and nominal dollars 
shown from 1956 to 2007 in billions of 2009 dollars. Figure 4 shows total public 
spending, comprised of expenditures by the federal, state and local governments. 
The total spending includes purchase, construction, rehabilitation, or 
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improvements of physical assets and equipment. The constant dollars shown in 
the graph have been adjusted to reflect the effects of inflation between the year 
the spending occurred and the base year 2009. Spending expressed in nominal 
dollars is the spending without the effect of inflation. 
 
Figure 4. Total Public Spending for Highway Capital, in Constant and     
     Nominal Dollars, 1956 to 2007 
     Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2010 
The graph in Figure 5 shows the federal spending on highway projects 
from 1985 to 2000 as compared to the spending by the state and local 
governments. The federal spending has been fairly constant over the given period; 
meaning the state and local governments have been left to take the burden of 
required investment in the highway construction industry. The spending includes 
the construction of new facilities and also the operation and maintenance of the 
existing ones. Both categories need more financial support from the federal 
government. With this much unavailable, yet necessary federal funding, 
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policymakers have reached a point where they are in search of innovative project 
delivery methods which are efficient in both cost and time. 
 
Figure 5. Spending on Highways by Federal and State & Local governments   
     in Billions of 1996 Dollars 
     Source: Government Transportation Financial Statistics 2001. BTS, US   
         DOT 
A project delivery method is a process of designing and constructing a 
facility. “The project delivery method is the process by which a construction 
project is comprehensively designed and constructed for an owner—including 
project scope definition; organization of designers, constructors, and various 
consultants; sequencing of design and construction operations; execution of 
design and construction; and closeout and start-up. In some cases, the project 
delivery method may encompass operation and maintenance.” (TRCP Report 
131). Another definition that describes project delivery method is given by Texas 
Department of Transportation (DOT) “A project delivery method equates to a 
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procurement approach and defines the relationships, roles and responsibilities of 
project team members and sequences of activities required to complete a project. 
A contracting approach is a specific procedure used under the large umbrella of a 
procurement method to provide techniques for bidding, managing and specifying 
a project” (Walewski, Gibson, and Jasper 2001). 
The project delivery approach most talked about by practitioners in North 
America at present is the Public-Private Partnership (P3/PPP). Since 1990, several 
government projects have been accepted to be delivered through the P3 approach 
by the transportation officials because of the severe economic constraints. The 
key element that differentiates this delivery approach from the more traditional 
methods like Design-Build (DB) and Design-Bid-Build (DBB) is the Finance 
element. In P3s the private entity not only designs and builds the government 
project but also finances it. The other important difference is that the DB and the 
DBB projects have been operated and maintained by government-managed 
entities but in the P3 method, the private entity would assume the responsibility of 
the operation and maintenance of the project for a certain contractual period. 
These projects are either tolled (toll - the fees collected from the user of the road 
by the public or the private entity that constructed the facility), or progressive 
payments (progressive payments – periodic payments made to the contractor by 
the owner of the facility) are made to the private entity by the government.  
In the last few decades, the Public-Private Partnership approach has been 
accepted around the globe including mature markets like Europe and Australia. In 
these markets, many research studies have been accomplished reporting the 
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efficiency of P3s in the construction world as compared to the traditional delivery 
methods. While in North America, comparisons have been made between the 
Design-Bid-Build, Design-Build and other traditional delivery methods, to date 
no comparisons have been made on the performance of Public-Private Partnership 
delivery method concentrated on the transportation sector with the non-traditional 
delivery methods. This could be because of the limited number of completed 
transportation P3 projects available for study. In the past two decades, a number 
of transportation P3 projects have been completed through the construction phase 
that allowed an initial investigation on the construction performance 
(concentrated on Cost and Schedule) of the P3 projects. Hence this appears to be 
the first comprehensive study that compares the cost and schedule performance of 
North American highway P3 projects to the more traditional DB and DBB 
projects. 
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in the US has taken steps 
towards trying innovative approaches to project development and delivery as a 
way to expedite the delivery of much needed transportation projects. For this, 
FHWA developed a Special Experimental Project (SEP) programs in which the 
federal as well as the state transportation agencies test and then evaluate new 
methods of delivering the projects. The SEP-14 was established by the FHWA in 
1990 with the objective of reducing life-cycle costs of projects while maintaining 
product quality and contractor profitability. The projects under this program 
included roads, highways, bridges, tunnels, Intelligent Transportation Systems, 
etc. that ranged from micro projects (less than $2 million) to mega projects 
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(greater than $100 million). Under SEP-14, 282 Design-Build projects were 
proposed to be constructed in different states which included 19 mega projects. 
These 19 mega projects representing only 7 percent of the total number of 
projects accounted for 73 percent of the total investment in the transportation 
infrastructure projects which was greater than $10 billion (Design-Build 
Effectiveness Study, 2006 by FHWA). 
To further increase private participation in public projects, FHWA 
initiated the SEP-15 program in which the goal was to increase project delivery 
flexibility, encourage innovation, attract private investment in transportation 
improvements, improve schedule containment of projects, and promote public-
private partnerships. The key motive of the P3 delivery approach is to increase the 
life-cycle cost efficiency (Nossaman LLP website, 2012). Design-Build-Finance-
Operate-Maintain (DBFOM) is the approach that undertakes the oversight of the 
project over a longer period, and shares and possibly transfers much of the risks 
from the Public side to the Private side. Texas, Virginia, Florida and Colorado 
have procured new transportation infrastructure projects that involve private 
investment as outlined in the SEP-15 program. Eight P3 projects worth $13 
billion are under construction in the above mentioned states (ARTBA, May 2011) 
as shown in Figure 6. These projects include the toll roads as well as projects on 
availability payments from the public entity. 
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Figure 6. P3 projects under construction in the US 
    Source: ARTBA, May 2011 
In a recent article, published in the China Daily, March 2012; Zhang Yuwei 
reports that China, after evaluating the crumbling infrastructure of the US is 
considering investing into infrastructure projects in the US. This article states that 
about one third of the roads in the US are in poor or mediocre condition, and one 
fourth of the bridges are said to be either structurally deficient or functionally 
obsolete. Also, it states that in the annual infrastructure report of American 
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), the US transit system is rated as “D” which is 
a major concern for the US. The overall US infrastructure rating has fallen from 
8th to 16th position in 2011-12 rankings in the past three years according to the 
World Economic Forum’s economic competitiveness ranking (Figure 7). The 
Yuwei report also states that China’s Ministry of Railways intends to spend about 
$300 billion on building transport systems through 2020; conversely the US 
Federal Railroad Administration commits $8 billion in similar projects in 2012. 
Experts say that US government lacks in funding and hence, Yuan Ning, president 
of China Construction America suggests collaborating through public-private 
partnership. The San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge is one of the examples of P3 
between a Chinese private entity and the US government. The cost of the project 
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was about $7.2 billion - having the Chinese contractor build it saved about $400 
million, according to the California Department of Transportation. 
 
 
Figure 7. Infrastructure Ranking of US in the World 
    Source: The Global Competitive Report 2011-12, World Economic   
                         Forum 
The growing implementation of P3 approach in the highway construction 
industry makes it necessary to compare the cost and schedule control performance 
of this method to the more traditional DB and DBB method. The study objective 
is to bridge the gap of missing studies in North American highway construction 
industry on P3s and serve as a basis to future studies that could further develop 
the methodology for P3 cost and schedule performance. 
1.2 DEFINITION OF P3, DBB & DB 
Public-Private Partnership (P3) can be a term which has no specific 
definition attached to it. Many definitions are available by practitioners and 
policymakers to express the Public-Private Partnership delivery approach. Acar 
M. et al. define P3 as, “.. an umbrella term referring to a variety of collaborative 
undertakings between public, private, and/or nonprofit organizations, ranging 
from simple coordination efforts between two organizations from different sectors 
to more comprehensive initiatives involving a significant number of individuals 
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and organizations representing all three sectors” (Acar M. et. al., 2008). 
According to E.S. Savas, “The term public-private partnership is particularly 
malleable as a form of privatization. It is defined broadly as an arrangement in 
which a government and a private entity, for-profit or nonprofit, jointly perform 
or undertake a traditionally public activity. It is defined as a complex relationship 
- often involving at least one government unit and a consortium of private firms” 
(Savas, 2010). These are some of the definitions that do not talk about the finance, 
operations or maintenance aspect of the delivery approach but only about the 
involvement of the private entity in the public sector projects. Indeed, as per 
Zarco-Jasso, there are eight different ways in which there could be a relation 
between the public and the private entity. The key elements associated with a 
project, which are control, funding and ownership could be handled by either the 
Private or the Public partner in the Public Private Partnership giving eight types of 
P3 (Zacro-Jasso, 2005). Hence, the above mentioned definitions do not lead us to 
a precise explanation of the P3 delivery approach.  
 In 1992, the Private Financing Initiative (PFI) program was introduced in 
the United Kingdom with the vision of encouraging public-private partnership in 
the UK. PFI was designed to increase private sector involvement in the provision 
of public services. The report by Grahame Allen, The Private Finance Initiative, 
describes the most common form of PFI in which the private sector designs, 
builds, finances and operates (DBFO) facilities based on output specifications 
decided by the public sector (Allen, 2001).  
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 The US DOT report on P3s defines them as “a public-private partnership 
is a contractual agreement formed between public and private sector partners, 
which allows more private sector participation than is traditional. The agreements 
usually involve a government agency contracting with a private company to 
renovate, construct, operate, maintain, and/or manage a facility or system. While 
the public sector usually retains ownership in the facility or system, the private 
party will be given additional decision rights in determining how the project or 
task will be completed” (USDOT, 2007). A report from the General Accounting 
Office states that “P3 is a contractual arrangement between public and private-
sector entities, typically involving a government agency contracting with a 
business or non-profit entity in order to renovate, construct, operate, maintain, 
and/or manage a facility or system, in whole or in part, that provides a public 
service” (GAO, 1999). The two definitions above also mention that these 
agreements allow the private entity to invest a substantial amount in the project, 
helping the public entity to gain a different source of revenue and labor without 
making a substantial capital investment. This arrangement impacts positively the 
project delivery schedules, especially with the use of improved technological and 
managerial resources. 
“Public–Private Partnerships allow private companies to build, own and 
operate public projects such as schools and hospitals on behalf of the public 
sector. P3 contracts commonly require the private agent to take responsibilities for 
the performance of the asset over a long term, at least for a significant part of its 
useful life, so that efficiencies arising from long- term investment and asset 
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management can be realized”  (Nisar, 2007). Also, according to Frédéric Blanc-
Brude et al., public–private partnerships are defined as “infrastructure projects 
procured under DBFO/M-type contracts that bundle Design, Build, Finance and 
Operation/Maintenance” (Blanc-Brude et. al., 2009). The National PPP forum in 
Australia defines P3 as “a contracting arrangement in which a private party, 
normally a consortium structured around a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), takes 
responsibility for financing and long term maintenance or operation of a facility to 
provide long term service outcomes. This may involve the private entity taking 
responsibility for the design and construction of a component of new 
infrastructure; and/or taking over a long-term lease or concession over existing 
assets; and/or the development of a new long- term contract to operate and 
manage the infrastructure. Typical forms of procurement include: Design, Build, 
Finance and Operate/Maintain (DBFO/M), Build-Own-Operate and Transfer 
(BOOT) or Build-Own-Operate (BOO)” (National PPP Forum, 2008). These 
definitions of P3 take into account all five aspects of the delivery of a project - 
Design, Build, Finance, Operation and/or Maintenance - which is the P3 model 
that is considered in this study. 
 In the Design-Bid-Build method the owner procures the design and the 
construction of the project through different entities. The construction phase of 
the project is not initiated until the design is completely ready. A descriptive 
definition is given in the TRCP Report 131 characterizing DBB as a method in 
which “an owner retains a designer to furnish complete design services and then 
advertises and awards a separate construction contract that is based on the 
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designer’s completed construction documents. The owner is responsible for the 
details of design and warrants the quality of the construction design documents to 
the construction contractor” (TCRP 131, 2009). In theory, DBB method has 
various advantages compared to other delivery methods (Kay, 2009 & Beard et. 
al., 2001):  
• It encourages competition amongst bidders and after the design is 
complete for the contractors to bid.  
• The design firm is obligated to protect the long-term interests of the client. 
• Being an age old delivery method, most of the public entities have 
established their rules and guidelines for permits and use and hence DBB 
does not have to deal with many legal or political issues. 
• The contractors could come up with good cost estimates as they have 
access to the complete design of the project.  
On the other hand, disadvantages associated to DBB delivery method are 
(Kay, 2009 & Beard et. al., 2001): 
• The public sector retains all the risks of design defects and design changes 
and not the contractor. 
• The restriction of activities to be performed sequentially increases the 
project duration considerably. 
• Since the owner is carrying the major risk in the project, he has to identify 
the inadequacies in the work performed by the contractors as well as the 
subcontractors. 
The contractual flowchart for DBB project is as shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Contractual Flowchart for DBB projects 
In the Design-Build method, the owner gives the responsibility of the design and 
construction to a single entity in which the project enters the construction phase 
after a certain percentage completion of the project. TRCP Report 131 defines DB 
method in three major steps: “First, the owner develops an RFQ/RFP that 
describes essential project requirements in performance terms. Second, proposals 
are evaluated. Finally, with evaluation complete, the owner must engage in some 
process that leads to contract award for both design and construction services” 
(TCRP 131, 2009). The key advantages associated with DB delivery approach are 
(Kay, 2009 & Beard et. al., 2001): 
• The designer and the owner are involved at a very early stage of a project with 
almost the same starting point which leaves little room for potential   
discrepancies between them. 
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• For many projects the construction stage starts sooner, often times after thirty 
percent of the design had been completed, which saves time and construction 
inflation costs. 
• The designer and contractor working together at an early stage of the project, 
have opportunities for innovation and value engineering. 
The disadvantages of the DB delivery method are (Kay, 2009 & Beard et. al., 
2001): 
• The qualification criteria to bid for a DB project do not allow many firms to 
participate and hence does not encourage as much competition. Also, the 
smaller firms can be left out of the competition as the larger design and 
construction firms take the lead, having resource departments that strictly deal 
with DB projects. 
• The contract between the public and private entity has to be scrutinized in-
depth to avoid issues in the future. This is an intense negotiation period which 
could last for several months, where potential risks are carefully studied by 
each entity. Hence, a lot of time is invested before the commencement of 
construction which is not the case in DBBs. 
• The contractor in some cases could dominate the contracted design firm and 
influence the design according to its own convenience, while the owner would 
not have much of a say once the contract is signed. Hence, this potential risk 
should be addressed in the contract. 
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The contractual flowchart for DB delivery method is shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9. Contractual Flowchart for DB projects 
The key benefit of DB over DBB is the integration of design and construction 
during the project development lifecycle. In the case of DBB projects, they are 
separated. The DB approach allows parallel processing of activities, while DBB 
keeps the process sequential. As given in the Design-Build Effectiveness Study of 
FHWA in 2007, the difference in the sequencing of activities involved in the two 
delivery methods are shown with a simple figure (Figure 10). The overlap of the 
Final Design and Project Clearances phase with the Construction phase saves a 
significant amount of time in the DB process, while considerable time is lost in 
the selection of a Design firm and later again during the selection of the contractor 
to construct the facility. 
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Figure 10. Workflow in DB and DBB projects  
     Source: USDOT, FHWA, Design-Build Effectiveness Study, 2006 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 Policymakers in the North America are in search of a delivery method for 
the transportation infrastructure industry that would make the construction and 
maintenance of these structures more efficient in cost, time and quality. The issue 
is most critical with large highway projects which require large amounts of time 
and money yet have to deal with limited availability of resources. 
 Delivery methods like Design-Build and Design-Bid-Build are traditional 
delivery methods that have been popular in North America for decades and many 
studies have been conducted comparing the performance of DB versus the DBB 
method as mentioned further in this study. 
 On the other hand, Public-Private Partnership delivery method is gaining 
attention as it serves as an alternative technological, methodological and funding 
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source for a public project from a private source. This long-term delivery method 
needs to be assessed for its performance and efficiency in cost and time, 
compared to the Traditional delivery methods like DB and DBB. 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to assist practitioners determine the level of 
performance and efficiency of the Public-Private Partnership delivery approach. 
The P3 model considered in this research includes all five elements of delivery – 
Design, Build, Finance, Operation and Maintenance. The parameters for studying 
the performance of the delivery approach are chosen as cost and schedule of 
Construction portion of selected projects from an exhaustive list of highway 
DBFOM projects. Inference will be made on the cost and schedule performance 
of Public-Private Partnership approach as compared to the Design-Build and 
Design-Bid-Build delivery methods. 
1.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE  
This research has its criteria for selection of completed projects which 
allows it to have the sample of Public-Private Partnership projects accomplished 
between 1990 and 2010 in the North American continent which are greater than 
$90 million. The sample of projects does not include projects using DBFO or 
DBOM delivery approach or any project that at any stage was funded by a public 
entity. This research is based on DBFOM model of Public-Private Partnership. 
This study focuses only on highway projects with roads and bridges and not 
projects involving significant tunnels, as tunnels involve a different level of 
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complications and engineering and can affect the overall cost and schedule 
estimation in a dramatic way. 
The study concentrates only on the construction aspect of the DBFOM 
delivery approach because there are not enough projects available at present to 
analyze the Operation and Maintenance portions of the P3 delivery approach. 
Also, the data collected in this research is primarily gathered from Public agencies 
and other publicly available sources. As with other similar studies, the private 
sector is reluctant to share information and requested data that might provide 
insight into their operations. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Thorough review was done on the studies accomplished in the US that 
compare the cost and schedule performance of completed DB and DBB projects 
in the US. The studies similar to the criteria for selection of projects as used in 
this research were selected. Various reports are available in the US giving 
definitions of P3s and information on its advantages and disadvantages as 
compared to the Traditional delivery approach which are included in this 
literature review giving an insight on the apprehensions and view of public and 
private entities about P3s. Also, studies comparing the cost and schedule 
performance of P3s with the DB and DBB methods in other mature markets such 
as Europe and Australia were also reviewed. 
2.1 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON DESIGN-BUILD AND DESIGN-BID-
BUILD 
Four previous studies were found relevant to this research, comparing 
DBB and DB delivery methods in North American highway construction industry. 
These are the studies that provide a statistical comparison of cost and schedule 
performance of DB and DBB projects. The Warne study and Shrestha study have 
the sample of projects that match the criteria outlined for this P3 study. The 
FHWA and the Gransberg study compare that could compare the performance of 
small scale DB and DBB projects. The FHWA study projects are less than $20 
million and Gransberg projects fall under $10 million in final construction cost. 
The most extensive performance assessment of DB highway projects was 
completed by Tom Warne and Associates in 2005. However, in this study they did 
  23 
not compare any completed DBB projects with the DB projects. They reviewed 
21 projects across the US that ranged in size from US$83 million to US$1,300 
million and were constructed between 1990 and 2005. The four aspects that were 
studied for each of the projects were schedule, cost, quality and owner 
satisfaction. The study collected data on the 21 projects and then asked the project 
managers hypothetical questions: for example, “Provide an estimate of how much 
time the project would have taken if the DBB project delivery process had been 
followed in place of the DB approach”. The answer was a professional estimate, 
but no direct comparisons could be made between the DB and DBB projects. The 
Schedule analysis showed that thirteen out of the twenty one DB projects 
indicated that schedule was the principle reason behind selecting DB as the 
project’s delivery method. The results showed that a hundred percent of the 
selected projects were built faster with the DB method than they would have been 
with the DBB method, and seventy six percent of the projects were finished ahead 
of schedule. One of the key findings of the study by Warne was that DB offers 
greater price certainty and reduced cost growth than DBB. Also, the cost growth 
for these projects ranged from zero percent growth to twelve percent growth with 
an average cost growth of less than four percent. Seven out of the twenty one DB 
projects were partially funded using toll revenues because of the lack of financing 
available upfront to initiate the project (Warne, 2005).   
Shrestha in 2007 compared the performance of four DB and four DBB 
highway projects. The DB projects were selected from across the US, while the 
DBB projects were selected from Texas. The author tried to select the comparable 
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DB projects from Texas. However, only two would match. The shortlisted four 
DB and four DBB projects had construction completion dates between 2000 and 
2006, and involved construction of roadways with design and construction cost 
greater than US$100 million. The two Texas DB projects identified were under 
construction; hence various out-of state FHWA DB projects approved under SEP-
14 were selected. The design and construction cost of these projects ranged from 
US$165 million to US$1,150 million, and the design and construction cost of 
DBB projects ranged from US$146 million to US$301 million. The DB projects 
chosen were the most similar to the SH 130 in Texas (the largest DB project of 
Texas) but could not be included in the study because it was under construction. 
Sixteen project characteristics were studied for various DB projects and a sample 
of four DB projects was selected. The sample projects were comparable to the 
chosen DBB projects from Texas and were also similar to SH 130 of Texas. The 
average percentage cost change for DB and DBB projects was reported as 1.49 
percent and 12.71 percent, while the average percentage schedule change was 
found to be 11.04 percent and 4.34 percent for DBs and DBBs respectively. Due 
to unavailability of complete data about the DBB projects, only schedule growth, 
cost growth and change order cost factor were considered for the statistical 
analysis in this study. The projects in Srestha’s study are comparable with the 
criteria for this study on P3 projects, allowing a comparison of DBB, DB, and P3 
project delivery (Shrestha, 2007). 
The FHWA completed a study in 2006 on the effectiveness of the Special 
Experimental Projects No. 14 (SEP-14) program, which enabled state 
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transportation agencies to test and evaluate a variety of alternative contracting 
methods (DB being a core element of SEP-14). This study obtained data on 11 
pairs of DB and DBB projects regarding cost and schedule growth. All costs for 
all projects were less than US$20 million — much smaller than this study’s target 
projects. The average percentage change in planned versus Actual Total Project 
Duration for DB projects was found as -4.2 percent while for DBB projects was 
4.8 percent. The average percentage change in planned versus actual construction 
phase duration for DB project was found as -1.2 percent and for DBB projects 
was 11.6 percent. The average percentage change from the Award project cost to 
the Final project cost for DB projects was found as 6.0 percent while for DBB 
projects was found to be 4.3 percent. And, the average change in the construction 
cost for DB projects was found as 8.1 percent while for DBB projects was found 
as 4.3 percent. The leading reason for the increase in project costs was the change 
orders which were due to the requests for additions or subtractions made by the 
owner, while the second main reason was the changes suggested by the design-
builder or contractor (FHWA, 2006). 
Gransberg et al. in 2000 compared the cost and schedule performance of 
several alternate delivery method projects from Florida DOT, Indiana DOT and 
Texas DOT. A total of 280 DBB projects were studied - with an average of 3.93 
percent increase in cost from the original contract amount and 28.25 percent 
increase in schedule from the original completion date. Gransberg’s study 
included 21 DBB and 11 DB projects, completed by the Florida Department of 
Transportation, with an average cost of $8,829,271 for the 21 DBB projects and 
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$2,771,715 for the 11 DB projects. Although all the projects were under US$10 
million, much smaller than this study target projects, DB still showed 
improvement of both cost and schedule growth over DBB. The average 
percentage cost growth and time growth for the 21 DBB projects by FDOT was 
reported as 10.64 percent and 33.50 percent respectively - greater when compared 
to the 11 DB projects by the FDOT where the average cost growth was reported 
as -1.99 percent and average schedule growth was -35.70 percent. The time 
growth performance for DB and DBB projects are shown polar opposite in this 
study and the difference is an enormous 69.2 percent in total. This study shows 
that the DB performance for projects under $10 million is very good and it saves 
delivery time to a large extent over the traditional delivery methods (Gransberg, 
2000). 
Table 1. Research Summary of Design-Build versus Design-Bid-Build 
 
Research Study Research Abstract 
Delivery 
Method 
Percent 
Cost 
Change 
Percent 
Schedule 
Change 
Warne  
21 DB projects across the 
US with the individual 
project costs greater than 
US$83 million 
DB 4 −11 
Shrestha  
4 pairs of similar DBB and 
DB projects with the 
individual projects costs 
greater than US$100 million 
DB 1.49 11.04 
DBB 12.71 4.34 
FHWA  
11 pairs of DBB and DB 
projects 
Cost of individual projects 
under US$20 million 
DB 6.0 −4.2 
DBB 4.3 4.8 
Gransberg  
21 DBB projects and 11 DB 
projects 
Cost of individual projects 
under US$10 million 
DB −1.99 −35.7 
DBB 10.64 33.5 
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Of all the studies mentioned above, the Warne study shows the cost and 
schedule performance of DB projects; but only the Shrestha study has DB and 
DBB projects that match to the size and other criteria of the projects studied in 
this research on P3s. 
2.2 P3 STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 
A number of P3 studies have been conducted in North America but none 
shows the performance (cost and schedule containment) of North American 
transportation P3 projects.  
In 2007 a report that focused on P3 applications to transportation projects 
in the US was prepared by AECOM for the Office of Policy & Government 
Affairs, FHWA. This report mentions that the comprehensive evaluation of 
completed P3 projects is often restricted or incomplete due to the commercial and 
political nature of P3 arrangements (FHWA, 2007). It also states that the 
personnel associated with the projects disperse as soon as their role finishes in the 
delivery method and limits the amount of information that could have been 
derived from these personnel if they were available. It has always been difficult to 
reach the private sector for information and even if contacts were successful, 
many were reluctant to answer questions regarding issues that arose during the 
project and the means and ways to overcome them. On the other hand, the public 
sector was willing to share the information and answered all questions asked. 
International transportation P3 projects that were included in this study were from 
England, Australia, China, Denmark, Sweden, India, Israel, and Argentina. A 
majority of the P3 projects which were planned and funded since 1985 were road 
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projects which accounted for 37 percent of the total investment in various sectors 
such as rail, road, airport, seaport, water and buildings. P3s have been more 
widespread overseas highway, with concessions and Build-Own-Transfer/Build-
Transfer-Operate being the forms of P3 approaches that were used. The report 
states that over the last 20 years Europe has the largest P3 infrastructure in terms 
of cost for road and rail projects; Asia being second and North America being 
third. This report by FHWA indicates that all the projects that have a private 
entity involved in its delivery approach comes under the umbrella of P3, be it DB 
or DBOM or DBFO or concession. 
Another study on ‘The Role of Private Investment in Meeting U.S. 
Transportation Infrastructure Needs’ was published in May 2011 by The 
American Road and Transportation Builders Association (ARTBA). It gives an 
overview of the P3 projects in the US. The definition of P3 in the ARTBA study 
includes the DB delivery method as a P3 delivery approach. According to this 
study, in the past 22 years $54.3 billion of transportation P3 projects have been 
let. Out of this $54.3 billion, 79 projects (accounting for $31.5 billion) were either 
Design-Build (DB), Design-Build-Finance (DBF) or Design-Build-Operate-
Maintain (DBOM) contracts. Eleven transportation P3 projects worth of $12.4 
billion are let by the Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintain (DBFOM) contract 
or as concession agreements. The authors were in support of the P3 delivery 
approach and provided recommendations for increasing private investment in the 
needed U.S. transportation infrastructure. Suggestions include: 1) The USDOT to 
develop a “National Strategic Transportation Business Plan” for expansion of 
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existing facilities and reconstruction of aging infrastructure. 2) To support private 
investors by asking to enhance the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and 
Innovation Act (TIFIA) and Private Activity Bond (PAB) tools. 3) To attract 
Pension Funds from insurance companies and others. 4) Education of the Public 
side is needed so that appropriate projects are delivered with the private financing 
toolbox without hindrance 5) Ease of federal restrictions is needed. Federal law 
has four pilot programs to allow tolls on interstate mileage for specific purposes. 
The restrictions should be relaxed and allow this tolling and pricing program to be 
applied in all the states (ARTBA, 2011). 
In July 2011 the Office of Inspector General (OIG) report by the FHWA 
gave the financial analysis of P3 transportation projects. The objectives of the 
report were to identify the disadvantages of P3 as well as the financial value of 
the P3s to the public as compared to the traditional delivery methods, and to 
assess the extent to which P3s can bridge the infrastructure funding gap of $138 
billion for 2008-2035 (Figures from the National Surface Transportation 
Infrastructure Financing Commission, 2009). The key disadvantage for the P3s 
according to the study was the higher cost of capital - because of the taxes on 
private money for P3s as compared to the public debt which is tax free. P3s 
incorporate equity financing which generally has very high interest rates. 
Additionally, the private entity has to pay federal, state and local taxes; which is 
exempt in the case of public debt. The efficiency in the operation and 
maintenance portion of the delivery does not contribute much to the magnitude of 
cost disadvantages. The disadvantages with the P3 financing can be overcome 
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with the help of innovative, less costly financing programs like TIFIA and PABs, 
and with more flexible sources of capital. The report also states that P3s change 
the timing of funding by providing the funds for the project upfront but does not 
reduce the amount of the funds required. Every project is different in risk 
allocation and expediency of project delivery and hence, decision of the project 
delivery method should be made on a case by case basis by identifying specific 
project requirements and in-depth project analysis (OIG, 2011).  
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) published a report 
on P3s for Transportation in 2010 which would act as a toolkit for the legislators 
considering P3 project delivery. This report indicates that P3 projects differ based 
on mission (the focus of the project) and on method (the project delivery model) 
and source of financing. The project could be a brownfield project (operation, 
maintenance or improvement of existing infrastructure), or, a greenfield project 
(development of new facility), or, it could be a combination of greenfield and 
brownfield project, (an addition of a new toll lane onto an existing facility). The 
NCSCL study provided a number of models for the P3 delivery method. This 
includes Design-Build (DB), Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM), Design-
Build-Finance (DBF), Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO), Design-Build-
Finance-Operate-Maintain (DBFOM). The private entity could assume any of the 
roles in a P3 delivery, be it design, build, operate, maintain or finance, or even 
ownership for a limited term. This interpretation of P3 by NCSL is different from 
the one used in this study which defines DBFOM model as the P3 model for 
study. The other characteristic of a P3 mentioned is the source of financing which 
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unlike this study could be from any private or public or a combination of both the 
entities rather than being from the private entity only. After having studied the P3 
delivery approach, the NCSL come up with nine principles to be implemented and 
decision makers to come up with sound decisions (Figure 11). P3s should be 
analyzed in a broader perspective, looking out for long term public interest and 
should be considered as a support to the state’s transportation mission and not just 
as a source of revenue. A comparison with the traditional approach to determine 
the best option for delivering the project, clarity in financial issues and 
transparency in procurement process were principles mentioned in the NCSL 
report for improving the P3 delivery approach (NCSL, 2010). 
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Figure 11. Principles For State Legislators for successful P3  
       Source: NCSL, 2010 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in January 2012 reported that 
public-private partnerships have built highways slightly less expensive and 
slightly faster when compared to the traditional procurement approach. This 
report explains that most of the financial risks are handled by the public entity in 
the traditional approach (DBB). The funding for these highway projects is 
primarily allocated from taxes on fuel (18.3 percent per gallon for gasoline and 
24.3 percent per gallon for diesel) by the federal government. Also, taxes from 
truck tires and heavy motor vehicles (>55,000 pounds) are a source of funding to 
  33 
the Highway Trust Fund. These funds have not been sufficient to support the 
construction of new infrastructure and the maintenance of existing facilities. This 
federal funding is allocated to the states for construction of highway projects on a 
matching rate as dictated in the Federal-Aid Highway Program. State revenues for 
highway projects are primarily collected from the gasoline taxes which range 
from 8 cents per gallon in Alaska to 50 cents per gallon in California with an 
average of 31 cents per gallon for states and localities (American Petroleum 
Institute, May 2011). Vehicle license fees, highway tolls and other taxes such as 
driver’s license fees are also collected by certain states to pay for highway 
projects. These sources of funds are still not enough to provide for the financial 
needs in the highway construction industry. 
The delivery approach that encompasses the broadest set of private roles is 
the Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintain method. Ten such projects have been 
let in the US between 1989 and 2011 where the private entity is responsible for 
building, financing and also operating and maintaining the facility for a long term 
as contracted with the public entity. These 10 North American P3 projects cost a 
total of $12.7 billion (2010 dollars) while P3 has been applied as a delivery 
method for projects of approximately $653 billion (excluding projects in US) of 
which $327 billion projects were road projects (Public Works Financing, Oct 
2010). The CBO report states that there is a scarcity of studies on the performance 
of P3s in North America and it has commented on the performance of P3s based 
on those limited studies. The report concludes that for a successful P3 
implementation "… the government involved must design, implement, and 
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monitor contracts that allocate risk and control between the public and private 
partners" (CBO, 2012). 
The Conference Board of Canada (CB of Canada) in Jan 2010 assessed the 
performance of major P3 projects that reached financial closure between early 
1990s and 2004, a period regarded as the first wave of P3s in Canada. The 
important lesson learned from the first wave of P3 projects in Canada was the off-
balance-sheet treatment of public sector liabilities which reduced transparency of 
public sector accounts. The revenue risk for most of the projects was completely 
transferred to the private sector which was not really tackled well by the private 
sector as it could not influence the flow of traffic to a great extent. Consequently 
this risk was realized and shared before the second wave of P3 projects. In some 
of the P3 projects, the financial risks associated with the projects were not fully 
transferred to the private consortium for which the public sector owners incurred 
higher costs of private financing without arguably enjoying its full benefits. The 
key findings on the P3 projects under consideration in this study were based on a 
thorough review of the literature and publicly available data on those projects, 
number of interviews with P3 practitioners from public as well as private sector 
and gathering data on key points in the procurement process. Nineteen projects of 
the 55 P3 projects studied had reached substantial completion. The data collected 
for those 19 projects showed that only two projects out of the 19 were late, up to 
two months, in delivery. The other 17 projects were delivered either ahead or on 
schedule, while all the 19 projects were accomplished within the stipulated public 
sector budget. These benefits of cost and time savings are associated with 
  35 
additional costs like the costs of transferring selected risks to the private partner, 
higher costs of private financing and higher transaction costs. Only 12 projects 
have already entered their operational stage and it is, therefore, too early to 
comment on the operational performance of P3 projects (CB of Canada, 2010). 
2.3 P3 STUDIES IN EUROPE AND AUSTRALIA 
The Public-Private Partnership delivery method has been adopted by 
policymakers around the globe with Europe and Australia among the mature 
markets for P3 projects. Following is an overview of the research relevant to the 
study of cost and schedule comparison of transportation projects delivered 
through P3 and the traditional delivery method in these mature markets.  
As Flyvbjerg et. al. mentioned in their 2002 report, the difference between 
geographical areas in terms of cost development is highly significant (p<0.001) 
and geography matters for cost escalation. They collected data for 258 
transportation projects (rail, fixed-link and road) around the globe and studied the 
inaccuracies in cost estimates. They reported that the average cost escalation for 
the road projects was less when compared to rail or fixed-link projects worldwide. 
They considered 167 road projects, 58 rail projects and 33 fixed-link projects in 
this study. Out of the 167 road projects in their study, they reported the cost 
escalation for 143 road projects in Europe to be 22.4 percent on average, and 8.4 
percent for twenty four (24) North American road projects. This indicates that it is 
necessary to develop statistics on performance of delivery methods to determine 
their efficiency and their credibility when applying them to future projects. It was 
found that in nine out of ten transportation infrastructure projects, cost was 
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underestimated. Also, in this study they explained that the reason for cost 
escalation for these projects was not because of technical deficiencies, inadequate 
data or lack of expertise, as cost underestimation has not decreased over the past 
70 years. They concluded in their research that cost underestimation could be best 
explained by strategic misinterpretation, i.e., lying (Flyvbjerg et. al., 2002). 
In 2003, the National Audit Office (NAO) of UK did a construction 
performance assessment for twenty five hospitals, seven prisons, nine roads and 
other departmental office accommodations and training facilities. The parameters 
chosen for assessment in this study were price containment, timing of 
construction delivery and quality of design and construction for projects which 
were due to be completed by summer,  2002. According to the NAO study only 
22 percent of the thirty seven Private Finance Initiative (PFI) projects exceeded 
the price agreed in the contract and only 24 percent of those projects were 
delivered late to the public sector. This is in contrast to a 1999 UK Government 
study on non-PFI projects that indicated only 30 percent of non-PFI projects were 
delivered on time and only 27 percent were completed within budget. In only 
eight percent of the projects, i.e. three projects, there was delay of more than 2 
months, and six projects were delayed by two months or less. In this sample of 
projects, all seven of the road projects were reported to be completed ahead of 
schedule. It was also mentioned that the increase in the PFI prices was due to 
changes that the government made in some of the specifications after the bidding 
was complete (NAO, 2003). 
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A study completed by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in 2009 
examined a sample of 66 P3 operational projects in Europe. Most of the projects 
in this study were from the United Kingdom, Spain and Portugal. The 
methodology in this study comprised of three key elements: (1) an analysis of the 
performance of the EIB P3 projects, (2) a literature review by other entities that 
have expressed their experiences with P3s and (3) interviews with their own staff 
to describe the lessons they learned from their P3 exposure. The sample of 66 
operational projects consisted of 41 P3 road projects. Actual and expected cost 
data was gathered for 51 projects and it was reported that 85 percent of the 51 
projects were delivered within or under budget. Schedule performance 
information was available for 48 projects from the sample of 66 projects and it 
was reported that 63 percent of the P3 projects were delivered either on time or 
ahead of schedule. Seventeen percent of the 48 projects had minor delays of up to 
one month (EIB, 2009). 
The Allen Consulting Group along with the University of Melbourne did a 
study that was one of its kinds in Australia in 2007, comparing the cost and 
schedule performance of P3 and traditional projects in that country. Twenty one 
P3 projects were compared with 34 traditionally built projects and the information 
collected for this study was public information. These projects were all 
undertaken around the year of 2000 with matching levels of complexity and were 
either fully completed or largely completed. The 21 P3 projects were AUD$4.9 
billion in total and the net cost overrun was reported as AUD$58 million while the 
33 traditionally procured projects were AUD$4.5 billion and the net cost overrun 
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amounted to AUD$673 million. The cost overrun for traditional projects was 
reported as 14.8 percent while that for the P3s was reported as 1.2 percent. The 
raw data on schedule-overrun for Traditional projects was reported to be 17.6 
percent, better than the P3 projects which was 24.3 percent. However, on a value-
weighted basis (between the signing of the final contract and project completion), 
traditional projects were likely to be 23.5 percent behind schedule while P3s were 
found to be 3.4 percent ahead of schedule. Also, construction timeliness and 
contractual cost adherence was studied at three key stages of completion for the 
projects in the sample. This sample of 21 P3s consisted of seven P3 transportation 
projects and 16 traditionally constructed transportation projects out of 33 
traditional procurement projects. 
The National PPP forum of Australia in 2008 undertook a study on the 
PPP cost and schedule performance for projects greater than $20 million which 
were initiated after January 1, 2000. The total P3 projects in this study were 25 
and traditional projects were 42 making a total of 67 projects which were from 
different categories including 32 social infrastructure projects, 23 transportation 
projects, eight sustainability (water, energy and waste) projects and four 
Information Technology projects. The 23 transportation projects consisted of four 
P3 and 19 Traditional projects. The average cost overrun for Traditional projects 
from all categories was found out to be 52 percent, while for the P3 projects the 
cost overrun was 23.8 percent. Hence, comparing the estimated cost to the final 
cost of the project, P3s perform 28.3 percent better than the Traditional projects. 
Also, 16.7 percent more P3s were completed per the cost estimate when compared 
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to traditional projects. The average time overrun for traditional projects was 
reported as 15.4 percent and for P3 projects it was 17.4 percent. The figures on 
schedule performance of P3s and traditional projects in this study showed that 
these projects were delivered with the same confidence in the overall time 
performance. These results of time and cost overruns in this study which are 
completely different from the results on P3 performance in other studies from 
other region also support the statement in the 2003 Flyvbjerg study that 
commented on the geographical conditions playing an important role in 
determining the project performance. In addition, the Australian traditional 
projects have better cost performance with 43.3 percent of those completed within 
five percent of the expected cost compared to a mere 27 percent of the UK 
Traditional projects as reported by NAO in 2003 (National PPP Forum, 2008). 
The above mentioned studies are the only ones with a portion devoted to 
transportation P3 project performance. None of the studies seem to focus on cost 
and schedule performance of large scale (greater than $100 million) highway 
projects. This study paves the way towards increased research in this area when 
more data is made available for a better indication on cost and schedule 
performance of P3.  
Also, other studies have reported cost and schedule performance of P3s in 
infrastructure projects, though not specifically for the transportation sector, which 
demonstrates the general efficiency of the P3 delivery method. These studies have 
been mentioned in brief below. The Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury study in 2003 
took a sample of 37 completed PFI projects with capital values below £20 million. 
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The study reported that there was a considerable difference between the 
construction and operational performance of larger projects when compared to 
smaller projects. The larger projects had a better performance than the smaller 
projects with the reason that the smaller projects would also have to bear the same 
costs of third-party finance, legal and technical advisors as the much larger 
projects. On the whole, 88 percent of the PFI projects considered in the HM 
Treasury study were delivered on time or ahead of schedule while only eight 
percent of the PFI projects were delayed by more than two months. The track 
record of the conventional government infrastructure projects has not been so 
impressive with 70 percent of the non-PFI projects delivered late as reported in 
the NAO study of Modernising Construction in 2001. The cost performance of 
PFI projects was equally good as only one-fifth of the projects from the HM 
Treasury sample experienced changes in the unitary charge which were due to 
changes initiated by the public sector client (HM Treasury, 2003). 
The NAO study on PFI projects in October 2009 is an extension to the 
report published by NAO in 2003 on the PFI performance. This report considers 
projects completed between 2003 and 2008 with a capital cost over £20 million 
that were constructed in England. Questionnaires were prepared for 153 projects 
to be surveyed out of which 114 completed the questionnaire. The 114 PFI 
projects studied in this research were from various sectors but not a single project 
was a road project. It was reported that out of 114 PFI projects 69 percent of the 
projects were delivered on time which is a reduction of seven percent from the 
data obtained in the NAO 2003 study. As mentioned before, this study had no 
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road projects in the sample of 114 PFI projects and the significant change of 7 
percent is partially due to that. Data on cost performance was gathered for 91 PFI 
projects and it was found that 64 percent of the projects were delivered per the 
contracted price. Also, it was reported that 94 percent of the projects were 
delivered with, or less than, five percent cost overrun and the remaining six 
percent reported price increases of five percent and more. The report also gave 
performance data for Non-PFI projects with capital value greater than £20 million 
completed within the period 2003 to 2008. A population of 225 Non-PFI projects 
was shortlisted for survey but only 22 percent of the total population responded to 
the questionnaires. The survey report indicates that 63 percent of these Non-PFI 
projects were delivered on time and 54 percent of the projects were delivered 
within the contracted price. 
2.4 GAPS IN LITERATURE AND SUMMARY 
 Comparison studies have been accomplished on large-scale DB and DBB 
projects in North America such as the Warne (2005) and the Shrestha (2007) 
study and also on small scale DB and DBB projects like the FHWA (2006) and 
the Gransberg (2000) study. The studies mentioned above do not give a 
comparison of the P3 delivery method with the traditional delivery methods. 
Studies have been successfully completed in Europe and Australia which give a 
comparison of P3s with the DBs and DBBs and similar studies are required in 
North America which could fill in this gap in the North American highway 
construction industry. 
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CHAPTER 3 : METHODOLOGY 
In this study, the following key steps were followed to compare the Public Private 
Partnership delivery method to the Traditional delivery methods of Design-Bid-
Build and Design-Build: 
1. Literature review of previous studies on DBB and DB highway 
projects 
2. Development of input and output metrics 
3. Criteria for selection of sample projects 
4. Data collection for sample projects 
5. Data analysis of collected data 
6. Comparison of P3 research results with previous studies of DBB 
and DB highway projects 
3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES ON DBB AND DB 
HIGHWAY PROJECTS 
In depth literature review was done to identify previously conducted studies that 
were relevant to this study. A couple of studies have been accomplished in the 
North American highway construction industry analyzing the performance of 
Design-Build and Design-Bid-Build delivery methods. The studies concentrated 
on Cost and Schedule performance of the projects accomplished through these 
delivery methods. These studies will act as the benchmark to compare the 
traditional delivery methods with the Public-Private Partnership approach.  
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3.2 DEVELOPMENT OF INPUT AND OUTPUT METRICS 
This research is focused on two performance parameters of the project delivery 
approaches - Cost and Schedule. This will determine the project performance for 
transportation projects regarding cost and schedule adherence, and the two key 
metrics used are cost change and schedule change. 
3.2.1 Cost Change 
Cost change is the difference between the actual project cost and the estimated 
project cost. The estimated project cost is the contract value of the capital 
expenditure specified in the P3 contract at financial close. The actual project cost 
is the cumulative value of all payments made by the sponsor(s) to the developer(s) 
to compensate for the construction of the project. 
 
 Percent cost change = (Actual project cost − Estimated project cost) × 100 
          Estimated project cost 
Percent cost change of: 
• zero indicates that the project was delivered at the same cost as estimated, 
• less than zero indicates that cost-savings have been made, 
• greater than zero indicates a cost-overrun from the estimated cost. 
3.2.2 Schedule Change 
The estimated construction duration is the time allotted in the contract for the 
construction of the project, and the final construction duration is the actual time of 
construction to the point of availability of use of the project. 
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               Percent schedule change = (Final construction – Estimated construction) X 100 
     duration   duration 
      Estimated construction duration 
 
Percent schedule change of: 
• zero indicates that project was delivered per the estimated schedule, 
• Less than zero indicates that project was completed earlier than estimated, 
• Greater than zero indicates that project had a schedule-overrun from the 
estimated schedule. 
3.3 CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF SAMPLE PROJECTS 
Sample Public-Private Partnership projects were shortlisted from a large pool of 
available listed projects. A general trend of the highway construction industry in 
the past few decades was observed which is mentioned in the Chapter 1 showing 
the requirement for funding of large scale transportation infrastructure projects in 
the US; and accordingly the criteria for the selection of projects for this research 
were developed. The research study project list was obtained from “Public Works 
Financing, September 2010”. From this list, the highway transportation projects 
meeting the following criteria were considered in this study. 
3.3.1 Projects Constructed in North America 
Public-Private Partnership has been a popular delivery approach in many mature 
markets around the globe, e.g. Europe, Australia. Studies have been conducted on 
P3 performance and efficiency for those regions; however, no similar studies have 
been accomplished for North America. 
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3.3.2 Projects Constructed Between 1990 and 2010 
Legislation passed over the past 20 years has allowed alternative project delivery 
approaches such as P3 and DB. With these new laws, states have utilized different 
project approaches to seek better cost and schedule control and this study is to 
compare the performance of these delivery methods and also the DBB approach. 
Most of the large P3 highway construction projects have been constructed 
between the time frame of 1990 and 2010. 
3.3.3 Projects with Construction Costs above US$90 Million 
Research by the Federal Highway Administration compared 11 pairs of projects 
under US$20 million using the DB and DBB methods (FHWA, 2006). The 
percent cost change for DBB (3.6 percent) was lower than that for DB (7.4 
percent). However, when Shrestha compared four large (over US$100 million) 
transportation projects, the cost change was significantly higher for DBB (12.71 
percent) compared to DB (1.49 percent). The difference in the results, show that 
any one single delivery method cannot be applied to all ranges of projects. Also, it 
is evident from the statistics that cost containment for large-scale infrastructure 
projects is more difficult in the DBB project delivery approach as compared to the 
DB approach. Under SEP-14, in July 2003 the Federal Highway Administration 
came up with the following conclusion - only seven per cent, i.e. a small 
percentage, of the projects approved to be completed by Design Build approach, 
were greater than $100 million each in value. However, the investment in these 
large scale projects constitutes 73 percent of the total investment in all approved 
projects. Hence, it is important to concentrate on the efficiency of projects with 
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those scales. This research examines whether or not the P3 approach better 
controls cost on these large-scale projects with construction cost above $90 
million. 
3.3.4 Highway and Bridge Projects Without a Large Signature Tunnel 
As noted by Blanc-Brude et. al., “Mixing motorways and other types of roads, in 
some cases including significant tunnel or bridge links, are ‘noisy’ in that they 
contain observations of very different technical natures and hence different cost 
structures” (Blanc-Brude et. al., 2009) Flyvbjerg et al. also documents that the 
average cost overruns for these different categories of infrastructure are very 
different, so that risk pricing would be expected to vary in each case (Flyvbjerg et. 
al., 2003). To ensure comparable sample projects, transportation projects without 
large signature tunnels were selected. 
3.3.5 Projects Procured Under a DBFOM Procurement Model 
The incentive for private industry to finance a project is to complete the work on 
time and begin receiving funds for the completed work. The incentive to produce 
a better quality project is due to the private partner accepting the long-term 
operations and maintenance (O&M) risks when O&M responsibilities are bundled 
with the DB work. Hence, this study focuses on projects that encompass the 
Design, Build, Finance, Operation and Maintenance portion of delivery. Projects 
that do not have any of the five elements to be delivered by the private entity 
(DBFO, DBOM, DBF) are not included in this research. Although none of the 
studied projects have had enough time to complete the entire contractual cycle of 
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the DBFOM procurement model, this study will lay the foundation for future 
research — the construction costs have been studied, to which the O&M risk and 
reward to the outcome can be added. Also, the definition of Public-Private 
Partnership that is considered in this study includes all five aspects of the project -   
Design, Build, Finance, Operate and Maintain. 
3.4 DATA COLLECTION FOR SAMPLE PROJECTS 
Data was gathered and the projects were confirmed to be DBFOM through a 
thorough literature review and a survey with personnel involved with the selected 
projects. 
3.4.1 Literature Review 
Initial data on the P3 projects was gathered from various databases found on the 
Internet. Afterwards, a comprehensive list of eligible P3 projects from the US and 
Canada was prepared. The list of transportation projects from the “Public Works 
Financing, September 2010 edition” was taken and compared with the initial 
project list and each project was studied individually to determine if it could be 
shortlisted in the study as per the criteria. Also, the P3 Project database from “The 
Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships” was reviewed to prepare a list 
of all North American P3 highway construction projects with construction costs 
over $90 million and with construction stage completion between 1990 and 2010. 
Information gathered from these websites and databases was verified by gathering 
more information on individual projects from their respective official websites. 
Maximum information about the two study parameters: cost and schedule was 
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compiled from official websites of the respective projects and state departments of 
transportation. To determine the cost change of a project under study, data was 
collected on the estimated and the actual project costs. To determine the schedule 
change of the project, data was collected on the estimated construction duration 
per the contract and the final construction duration. 
3.4.2 Survey 
 After collecting the data on the projects available from the Internet, a set 
of questions were prepared to survey public and private agencies involved in the 
selected P3 projects. Getting data from the private sector was a challenge, because 
of their reluctance to share information. The survey concentrated on the size, 
location, type, scope, procurement, force majeure and unanticipated risks 
associated with the project. The key emphasis was on the input and output 
variables: the estimated & actual construction cost, and, the estimated and actual 
construction time of the project that would determine the cost and schedule 
performance of the projects. This questionnaire included clear definitions of terms 
used in this research. The copy of the questionnaire used for the survey is 
available in the appendix.   
Interviews were conducted with government agencies officials involved in the 
construction and procurement of the projects under consideration. The 
interviewed individuals were project directors and/or project managers who had 
intimate knowledge of the project. The in-person interviews included similar 
questions as the written questionnaire, and the definitions of terms were 
thoroughly discussed and precisely put forward to the interviewee, as well. 
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3.5 DATA ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED DATA 
Data collected from the literature, written questionnaires and interviews was 
analyzed for percentage of cost and schedule change per the input and output 
metrics determined as the criteria of interest. Any changes — such as scope 
changes, owner’s additions or deletions, unanticipated risks, force majeure as 
decided by the public and the private entity — were considered in the analysis in 
order to determine how the change would affect the percent of change. The 
average cost change and average schedule change were then calculated for all P3 
projects under study, which provided the performance of the P3 procurement 
method for highway construction in North America. The overall cost and schedule 
containment for the 12 projects was also analyzed. 
3.6 COMPARISON OF P3 RESEARCH RESULTS WITH PREVIOUS 
STUDIES ON DBB AND DB HIGHWAY PROJECTS 
The literature review of previously published studies containing performance data 
for traditional DBB and DB project delivery approaches was then compared to the 
data collected on the above mentioned P3 projects. As stated before, the 
comparison between these delivery methods was done on cost/     schedule change 
parameters. 
  50 
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
4.1 ANALYSIS 
The cost and schedule performance of twelve transportation P3 large scale 
projects in North America have been studied. These projects range from $90 
million to US$840 million and are from California, Texas and Canada. These P3 
projects form an exhaustive list of large scale projects starting with an initial list 
from the Public Works Financing 2010, (see Appendix B). The projects 
categorized as DBFO and DBFOM were taken and a survey done to shortlist the 
large-scale DBFOM projects in North America. The focus was on DBFOM for 
the reason that this research follows the P3 model that encompasses all the five 
elements of delivery, namely, Design, Build, Finance, Operation and 
Maintenance. The project if delivered through DBFOM model or not was 
confirmed through further research from official project websites as well as 
various state Department of Transportation websites and surveys of Project and 
DOT officials. Finally a list of 12 P3 projects was developed which followed the 
DBFOM delivery approach (Table 3). 
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Table 3. List of P3 Projects Selected for this Study  
 
 Data was collected for these projects per the questionnaire (see Appendix 
A) that focused on cost and schedule information of the projects under 
consideration. The construction cost for these projects ranged from US$90 million 
(Project I) to US$840 million (Project K). The details on the project 
characteristics, construction cost and construction schedule for each of the 
projects have been attached in Appendix G. 
 This research is using cost and schedule as the two parameters to evaluate 
the performance of the P3 project delivery. The average change in cost and 
schedule data for the 12 P3 projects are calculated to eventually compare them 
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with the results of the DBB and the DB delivery method performance obtained 
from previous research studies. 
4.1.1 COST CONTROL 
 
Figure 12. Percentage Cost Change for P3s 
In this research of 12 P3 projects, ten of the projects exhibited cost containment 
and were completed within the contract amount, while Project C and Project E 
showed an increase in the construction cost compared to the contract amount 
(Figure 12). The reason for the increase cost for Project C was due to the 
Geotechnical issues that were not envisaged earlier. The construction cost for 
Project C was US$396 million and an increase of 3% accounted for an increase of 
US$12 million in the construction cost which made the final construction cost of 
the project as US$408 million. While, Project E reported an increase of 6.68 
percent in the construction cost for which the estimated construction cost was 
US$125.6 million and the final construction cost was US$134 million.  
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 The average of the cost performance for the 12 P3 projects under this 
study showed a cost increase of 0.81 percent. The average cost increase for DB 
projects in the Shrestha study is reported to be 1.49 percent, while the DBB 
projects were reported to be 12.71 percent. The Warne study indicated an average 
cost increase for DB projects of 4 percent for the 21 projects in that sample. From 
this comparison it is evident that cost containment is better in the DB projects as 
compared to the DBB projects but it is even better for the P3 projects which are 
DBFOM than the DB projects. The cost increases mentioned for these 12 
DBFOM projects are only for the construction costs and not the FOM (Finance-
Operate-Maintain) portion of the project delivery. The data on the cost 
performance of the projects indicates that more than 80 percent of the projects in 
the study were completed per the original contract cost. 
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4.1.2 SCHEDULE CONTROL 
 
Figure 13. Percentage Schedule Change for P3s 
 Unlike the cost performance, the schedule performance was in the 
negative (indicating construction finished ahead of schedule) as well as the 
positive region of the graph (Figure 13). Seven projects were delivered ahead of 
schedule but the reason for these projects to be completed early did not involve 
incentives to the private entity in terms of early progressive payments or early toll 
collection from the contract schedule. The incentive of investment return would 
not begin until after the project is available for public use and the operational 
portion of the contract begins. Thus, progressive payment or toll could not be 
collected until the O & M portion of the project started per the contract. Also, four 
of the 12 projects were delivered on schedule. Seven of the 12 projects were 
completed ahead of schedule. Only Project F exhibited a schedule overrun of 
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30.02 percent due to technical issues associated with the project – Major 
construction challenge was the big bridge of the project - a 1200m (3/4 mile) long 
eleven span bridge on a double row of columns going to a height of 55m (180ft) 
over the Otay River. Curving throughout its length and built of 644 precast 
segments up to 70 tons each the post-tensioned structure was an intricate work 
that seems to have proven more difficult and expensive than envisaged. 
 The average schedule change for the twelve projects was found out to be -
0.23 percent. The Shrestha study reported the average schedule growth for four 
DBB projects to be 4.34 percent and for the four DB projects, 11.04 percent. 
When comparing the schedule results of the P3 sample in this study with the DB 
and DBB projects in the Shrestha study, both DBB and DB show greater delay in 
schedule when compared to the P3 project schedule performance, but the Tom 
Warne study on the other hand reported a -11.00 percent schedule change for the 
21 DB projects. Although the sample is rather small to allow an inference for 
future projects, the available data indicates that more than 90 percent of the P3 
projects were completed early or on schedule. 
4.1.3 COMBINED PERFORMANCE 
Taking the cost and schedule performance collectively for the 12 projects, 
9 out of 12 projects did not have to any cost change or schedule increase. Project 
C and E showed an increase in cost of three and 6.68 percent respectively, 
however Project C was completed ahead of schedule and Project E was completed 
as per schedule. And, Project F exhibited a schedule increase of 30.02 percent 
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without affecting the contractual agreement of project construction cost. The 
public entity was not entitled for any cost changes and the construction cost of the 
project was determined per the contract.  
None of the 12 P3 projects exhibited an increase in cost as well as 
schedule. If we check the cost and schedule containment together for the projects, 
this accounts for a success rate of 75 percent for the P3 delivery method. The 
combined cost and schedule performance for the 12 projects in the sample could 
be better explained as shown in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14. Overall Cost & Schedule performance of P3s 
The X-axis in the figure shows the average percentage schedule change for 
projects while the Y-axis shows the average percentage cost change for the 
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projects. The numbers in each of the boxes represents the number of projects 
falling in that performance interval. For example, the number “7” in the green 
region represents the number of projects and shows that each of the 7 projects lie 
in the interval of (-5, 0] for average percentage cost change and in the interval of 
(-5, 0] for average percentage schedule change. The numbers in green region in 
the figure indicate that these projects did not show an increase in cost or schedule 
during the construction phase while the red region symbolizes increase in cost as 
well as schedule. Similarly, projects in the yellow region show only an increase in 
schedule, but no increase in cost while the grey region shows that the projects had 
an increase in cost, but not in schedule. 
 The above graph more clearly shows that none of the P3 projects lie in the 
red region indicating that no single project had a cost and schedule increase while 
9 projects contained well under cost and ahead of schedule. Together cost and 
schedule performance of P3 projects also shows a very good percent (75 percent) 
of projects being delivered successfully pertaining to cost and schedule 
containment. 
4.2 RESULTS 
Table 2. Percent Cost & Schedule Change for P3 projects 
Research Study Projects Delivery Method 
Percent 
Cost 
Change 
Percent 
Schedule 
Change 
Twelve projects between US$90 and 
$840million DBFOM 0.81 -0.23 
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 The percentage cost increase for the 12 P3 projects in this study showed 
an average of 0.81 percent while the average percentage schedule increase was 
calculated as -0.23 percent. These statistics on cost and schedule performance of 
P3s can now be compared with the cost and schedule performance of DBs and 
DBBs taken from similar research carried out by Shrestha and Warne (Figure 15). 
DB and DBB projects in these studies also lie within the same timeframe as the 
P3 projects in our study and all are large scale projects, i.e. approximately more 
than US$90 million. Additionally, the projects in the Shrestha and Warne studies 
are major road projects as are the projects in this study. 
 
Figure 15. Percent Cost & Schedule Change comparison with previous 
studies 
The results for the cost and schedule performance of these 12 projects are 
compared to similar research studies on DB and DBB projects in North America 
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with cost and schedule as the performance parameters. One of the previous 
studies that could be compared to this research is the Shrestha study of 2007 in 
which 4 North American DB mega projects were compared with 4 North 
American DBB mega projects on cost and schedule parameters. The cost of the 
projects in the Shrestha study is greater than $100 million ranging from $165 
million to $1150 million for DB projects and from $146 million to $301 million 
for DBB projects and they fall in the same time period as the projects under this 
study. 
 The other research that was relevant to our present work was the Warne 
study of 2005 which is widely accepted by the transportation agencies and 
practitioners all over the US of America. Our research also takes into account the 
21 DB projects in North America whose budgets exceed $83 million thus making 
them fall in the category of the large scale projects. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 SUMMARY 
 The research studies on P3s around the world have exhibited results that 
differ from each other quite significantly which highlighted the need to initiate 
this study on P3s in North America. The key parameters that determine the 
performance of a delivery method are the cost and schedule containment during 
the construction phase of the project. This research paves the way towards an 
analysis of a P3 performance study in North America for the highway 
construction industry using 12 large scale highway P3 projects from Canada and 
US with focus on cost and schedule performance during their construction phase. 
The results of this research indicate P3 have good cost and schedule performance 
with a success rate of 75 percent.  
Although the financing of P3 projects which is taken care of by the private 
sector is more expensive than the projects that are funded by the public, due to the 
taxes and interest associated with private money (OIG, 2011; CB of Canada, 
2010), P3s have shown great adherence to the contractual cost and time of the 
project which has made this delivery approach popular amongst policymakers. It 
is clear that the combination of faster delivery with very tight control over 
construction costs provides a benefit to the public. This study examines just one 
of the aspects of the P3 method of project delivery. Outside the scope of this 
study, a number of other aspects warrant examination that may reveal additional 
savings, efficiencies, and benefits to the public. The average percent cost increase 
of 12.71 percent for DBB as mentioned in the Shrestha study, 1.50 percent and 
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4.00 percent for DBs as found in the Shrestha and Warne studies, and 0.81 
percent in this study for the P3s shows the way towards improvement in 
structuring of innovative delivery approach. The average percent schedule 
increase of P3s in this study came out as -0.23 percent which is better than the 
4.34 percent and 11.04 percent for DBBs and DBs, respectively, as reported by 
Shrestha. However, the schedule control figure of -11.00 percent for DBs by 
Warne which is a polar opposite to the 11.04 percent for DBs by Shrestha shows 
the need to analyze a larger sample of projects. Then again, the -11.00 percent 
schedule change by Warne could also be due to the incentives and profit that the 
contractor could earn by finishing the project early and taking it to the operational 
stage. On the other hand, no incentives are given to the private sector for 
completing the construction of a P3 project early, and as the return on investment 
only begins once the project is open for public use and the operational portion of 
the contract begins. 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Substantial amounts of money are being invested in large scale 
transportation projects in North America, therefore, choosing the correct delivery 
method that could improve the efficiency of cost control of projects would \ help 
the economy and would save public money collected through taxes which is spent 
on these projects. P3s have shown to be cost and time effective in this research. 
The limitation of this study is that it deals only with the construction phase of the 
project delivery with a small sample of projects and not the Operation and 
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Maintenance portion of the P3 approach. Hence, research can be continued in this 
area on the following: 
• This research provides the foundation for research which should be 
expanded by adding more projects to the list giving strengthened 
performance statistics. 
• Not only the construction phase but also the Operation and Maintenance 
portion of the delivery method should be assessed as the projects complete 
their operation and maintenance phase. This would have to be a long term 
project as the O&M phase can last for 30-50 years. 
• This study lays foundation for the cost per lane mile comparison of the 
P3s with the DBs and DBBs. It would require a list of similar P3, DB and 
DBB projects (similar project characteristics) for which the cost per lane 
mile through each delivery approach could be compared. 
• An insight on the comparison of life-cycle asset management costs from a 
P3 compared to government costs. 
• Differences between availability of travel lanes between a project 
delivered as a P3 and a government-operated road built using traditional 
methods. 
• Net effects on carbon footprints of a roadway built and operated as a P3 
compared to a government-operated road built using traditional methods. 
• Economic benefits of wider use of the P3 model on large projects, and the 
lines of demarcation that separate the sensible decision point to engage a 
P3, DB, or DBB method of delivery. 
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This research points out that significant work is yet to be done in comparing the 
design build, design-bid-build, and P3 project delivery approaches that are 
currently being utilized by highway agencies. 
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Introduction and Purpose 
 
The purpose of our study is to compare the cost and schedule control performance 
of Public-Private Partnership (P3) projects to those procured under traditional 
methods such as Design-Bid-Build (DBB) or Design-Build (DB).  We are limiting 
the scope of our study to the construction phases of large-scale completed 
transportation projects in North America.  As you were involved in one project 
under consideration, would you be able to answer a few questions and provide 
clarification? 
Name 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Company 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Project Name 
______________________________________________________________ 
Project Description 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Estimated (Budget) Cost  
 At time of Project Financial Close (DBFOM)  
__________________________________________________________________ 
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Estimated Schedule (construction) 
 At time of approval of Project Financial Close (DBFOM)  
__________________________________________________________________ 
Final Construction Cost 
_______________________________________________ 
 Reasons for increase? (if any) 
____________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 Scope Increase? (if so, what) 
____________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 Unanticipated Risks?  (is so, what?) 
______________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Construction Time 
___________________________________________________________ 
 At Financial Close (Substantial Completion and Final Acceptance Dates) 
________________________________________________ 
 At completion (Actual Substantial Completion and Final Acceptance 
Dates) _____________________________________________ 
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 Reasons for increase in construction duration (if any) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
  Owner’s Delays? 
________________________________________________ 
  Scope Changes? 
_________________________________________________ 
  Unanticipated Risks? 
____________________________________________ 
  Force Majeure? 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
Definitions:   
Actual Project Costs:  The cumulative value of all payments (each indexed to the 
year of Financial Close) made by the Sponsor(s) to the Developer(s) to 
compensate the construction of the project 
Capital Expenditure: construction-related costs, does not include operation and 
maintenance (O&M)  
Change Order: a component of the change management process whereby 
changes in the Contract agreed to by the Sponsor(s) and Developer(s) are 
implemented, often involve the change of Contract Value and/or scope of work. 
Contract: the legal agreement between the Sponsor(s) and the Developer(s) 
related to the procurement and delivery of the project 
  72 
Contract Value: the monetary amount the Sponsor(s) is contracted to pay the 
Developer(s) to compensate for the Capital Expenditure upon the completion of 
the construction project, in local currency (either U.S. dollar or Canadian dollar) 
indexed to the present value of the year in which Financial Close takes place 
Cost Overrun: Actual Project Costs minus Estimated Project Costs 
Cost Overrun Percentage: Cost Overrun expressed as a percentage of Estimated 
Project Costs 
Developer(s): the private entity that is entering the contract with Sponsor(s) to 
deliver the project per the specifications and requirements set forth in the Contract 
Estimated Project Costs:  Contract Value of the Capital Expenditure specified in 
the Contract at Financial Close  
Final Acceptance: the occurrence of all events and satisfaction of all conditions 
set forth in the final acceptance clause of the Contract, as and when confirmed by 
the Sponsor’s issuance of a notice.  Typically includes these activities following 
Substantial Completion: 
• Completion and acceptance of all construction work 
• Completion and acceptance of all design and construction submittals 
• Completion and acceptance of all punch-list items 
• Acceptance of as-built drawings 
Financial Close: the point at which all contracts are signed by all parties involved 
in a project, including lenders, equity holders, Sponsor(s), Developer(s).  It is the 
  73 
moment when the Developer(s) has/have successfully raised the financing needed 
to build the project 
Sponsor(s): the governmental agency or related authority that is awarding the 
Contract to the Developer(s) 
Substantial Completion: the occurrence of all events and satisfaction of all 
conditions set forth in the substantial completion clause of the Contract, as and 
when confirmed by the Sponsor’s issuance of a notice
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PUBLIC WORKS FINANCING SCORECARD OF PPP 
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APPENDIX C 
 
COST AND SCHEDULE GROWTH RESULTS FROM SHESTHA STUDY IN 2007 
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APPENDIX D 
 
COST AND SCHEDULE GROWTH RESULTS FROM WARNE STUDY IN 2005 
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APPENDIX E 
 
COST AND SCHEDULE GROWTH RESULTS FROM FHWA IN 2006 
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APPENDIX F 
 
COST AND SCHEDULE GROWTH RESULTS FOR GRANSBERG ET AL. IN 2000 
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APPENDIX G 
 
INFORMATION ON P3 PROJECTS SELECTED FOR THIS STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
Project Code A 
Project Name Okanagan Bridge / William R. Bennett Bridge 
Location British Columbia, Canada 
Estimated construction cost ($ million) US$144.5 
Final construction cost ($ million) US$144.5 
Estimated construction schedule June 30, 2005 – July 1st, 2008 
Final construction schedule June 30, 2005 – May 31st, 2008 
Reasons for schedule change 
The unanticipated events were negotiated 
for 73 days addition to the estimated final 
construction date. The project was 
completed 108 days ahead of the adjusted 
schedule. This shows the high efficiency in 
schedule control of P3 delivery model. 
Project characteristics 
The new, 5-lane William R. Bennett Bridge 
(WRBB) will replace the existing 3-lane bridge 
and form part of Highway #97, crossing 
Okanagan Lake (approx. 1 km (0.62 miles)). 
Also, upgrading the east and west 
approaches to the bridge to improve traffic 
flow, with additional lanes and intersection 
improvements. 1.1 km (0.68 miles) of 
approach roads of 5 lanes. 
Lane miles  6.5 
Cost per lane mile (US$ million/mile) 22.23 
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Project Code B 
Project Name Anthony Henday Drive 
Location Alberta, Canada 
Estimated construction cost ($ million) US$365 
Final construction cost ($ million) US$365 
Estimated construction schedule June 25th 2005 – Oct 26th, 2007 
Final construction schedule June 25th, 2005 – Oct 23rd, 2007 
Project characteristics 
11 kms (6.84 miles) will be constructed. 
Including multiple lanes and bridge 
structures this represents 50 lane kms (31 
lane miles). It includes 22 separate bridge 
structures. The major structures are five 
interchanges, three overpasses, and three 
flyovers: Interchanges (on and off access to 
and from the ring road) at Gateway 
Boulevard/Calgary Trail, 91 Street, 50 
Street, 17 Street and Highway 216 
Overpasses (same as a fly over except over 
rail road tracks instead of a roadway) at the 
CPR tracks/Parsons Road, CNR 
tracks/Highway 216 and CNR 
track/Highway 14. Flyovers (bridges over 
the highway with no on or off ramps) at 66 
Street, 34 street and 34 Ave. 
Lane miles 31 
Cost per lane mile (US$ million/mile) 11.77 
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Project Code C 
Project Name Northeast Stoney Trail 
Location Alberta, Canada 
Estimated construction cost ($ million) US$396 
Final construction cost ($ million) US$408 
Estimated construction schedule April 1st, 2007 – Nov 30th, 2009 
Final construction schedule April 1st, 2007 - Nov 2nd, 2009 
Reasons for cost change 
Change orders of 3%. This was 
because of Geotechnical issues. 
Project characteristics 
The total length is 21km (13.05 
miles). Work for the project 
includes: Six-lane sections from 
Deerfoot Trail to Metis Trail (44 
Street NE) and McKnight Boulevard 
to 16 Avenue NE (other sections are 
four-lane) Interchanges at Deerfoot 
Trail, Metis Trail, Country Hills 
Boulevard, Airport Trail, McKnight 
Boulevard, and 16 Avenue NE 
Signalised t-intersection at 17 
Avenue SE (an interchange will be 
built when Stoney Trail is extended 
south of 17 Avenue SE). 
Construction of two new railway 
bridge structures and rehabilitation 
of two existing railway bridge 
structures 
Lane miles 58.92 
Cost per lane mile (US$ million/mile) 6.92 
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Project Code D 
Project Name Phase 2 - Kicking Horse Canyon 
Location British Columbia, Canada 
Estimated construction cost ($ million) US$143 
Final construction cost ($ million) US$143 
Estimated construction schedule Oct 28th, 2005 – Nov 15th, 2007  
Final construction schedule Oct 28th, 2005 – Aug 31st, 2007  
Project characteristics 
Converting existing 2 lane to 4 lane 
for 5.8 kms (3.6 miles). Phase 2 
improvements involve the design, 
construction and financing of a 5.8 
km segment of the Kicking Horse 
Canyon including the replacement 
of the existing Park Bridge. 
Lane miles 14.4 
Cost per lane mile (US$ million/mile) 9.93 
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Project Code E 
Project Name CPTC 91 Express Lanes 
Location California, United States 
Estimated construction cost ($ million) US$125.6 
Final construction cost ($ million) US$134 
Estimated construction schedule July 1st, 1993 – Dec 27th, 1995 
Final construction schedule July 1st, 1993 – Dec 27th, 1995 
Project characteristics 
10 mile 4 lane expressway. The 91 Express 
Lanes are located in the median between the 
eastbound and westbound lanes of the SR-91 
Freeway between the junction of SR-55 and 
the Orange/Riverside County Line. The 91 
Express Lanes provide two extra lanes in each 
direction for most of the 10 mile length of SR-
91. 
Lane miles 40 
Cost per lane mile (US$ million/mile) 3.35 
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Project Code F 
Project Name South Bay Expressway 
Location California, United States 
Estimated construction cost ($ million) US$635 
Final construction cost ($ million) US$635 
Estimated construction schedule May 1st, 2003 - Oct 31st,  2006 
Final construction schedule May 1st, 2003 - Nov 19th, 2007 
Reasons for schedule change 
The work was complicated by the bracketing of 
an untolled 3.5km (2.2 miles) Connector 
Interchange (with SR54) and Gap expressway 
project at the northern end for Caltrans with 
the 15km (9.3 mile) SBE toll road to the south. 
Major construction challenge was the big 
bridge of the project - a 1200m (3/4 mile) long 
eleven span bridge on a double row of columns 
going to a height of 55m (180ft) over the Otay 
River. (The height was needed to limit highway 
grades on the approaches - no ocean-going 
ships though they'd fit!) Curving throughout its 
length and built of 644 precast segments up to 
70 tons each the post-tensioned structure was 
an intricate work that seems to have proven 
more difficult and expensive than envisaged. 
There were complex 'community development 
projects' such as hiking, bicycle and equestrian  
trails and an athletics complex worth $18m and 
nearly $20m of 'environmental mitigation' as 
part of the deals done to overcome opposition 
to the project from local groups and federal 
regulators (EPA). 
Project characteristics 
The SR 125 South project will initially be 
constructed as a four-lane, 11.5-mile limited 
access highway.  The project includes a two-
mile non-tolled segment funded by SANDAG, 
known as the San Miguel Connector, and a 9.3-
mile privately-financed toll road. 
Lane miles 37.20 
Cost per lane mile (US$ million/mile) 17.07 
 
 
95 
 
Project Code G 
Project Name Sea to Sky Highway  
Location British Columbia, Canada 
Estimated construction cost ($ million) US$450 
Final construction cost ($ million) US$450 
Estimated construction schedule August 1st, 2005 – Nov 30th, 2009 
Final construction schedule August 1st, 2005 – Sept 30th, 2009 
Project characteristics 
Highway Improvement project - 
Total lane length = 296.70 kms 
(184.36 lane miles) which includes 
Temporary lanes = 155.7 kms (96.74 
lane miles) 
Lane miles 184.36 
Cost per lane mile (US$ million/mile) 2.44 
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Project Code H 
Project Name Fredericton Moncton Highway 
Location New Brunswick, Canada 
Estimated construction cost ($ million) US$585 
Final construction cost ($ million) US$585 
Estimated construction schedule April 1st, 1998 - Nov 30th, 2001 
Final construction schedule April 1st, 1998 - Oct 1st, 2001 
Project characteristics 
195 kilometres (121.17 miles) of 
four-lane highway from Longs 
Creek to Magnetic Hill. 21 
interchanges (including four high 
speed interchanges). Five 
structures across rivers. St. John 
River bridge - fourth longest in 
province - 1,063 metres. Jemseg 
River bridge - fifth longest in 
province - 977 metres. 37 
standard structures - (378 
concrete beams). 26 open arch 
structures.  
Lane miles 484.64 
Cost per lane mile (US$ million/mile) 1.21 
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Project Code I 
Project Name Camino Columbia Bypass 
Location Texas, United States 
Estimated construction cost ($ million) US$450 
Final construction cost ($ million) US$450 
Estimated construction schedule Jan 30th, 1997 - Oct 1st, 2000 
Final construction schedule Jan 30th, 1997 - Oct 1st, 2000 
Project characteristics 
SH 255 begins at the Colombia Solidarity 
International Bridge on the United States-
Mexico border northwest of Laredo in Webb 
County. It heads northeast from the border as 
a 4-lane divided highway to an intersection 
with FM 1472. The highway continues to the 
northeast as a 4-lane divided highway but 
merges down to a 2-lane road just west of the 
former toll barrier. SH 255 continues northeast 
to an intersection at FM 3338 and a diamond 
interchange with US 83. It continues to the 
northeast to its eastern terminus at I-35 
Lane miles 54 
Cost per lane mile (US$ million/mile) 8.33 
Notes 
Decided as a lifetime toll road but project failed 
in 6 years. An independent auditor predicted 
that the Camino Colombia road would generate 
$9 million in revenue within the first year, but 
instead it only received $500,000. By 2004, the 
toll road had failed and bondholders foreclosed 
on the remaining $75 million note. The road 
was sold at an auction for $12.1 million to John 
Hancock Financial Services Inc. TxDOT had 
initially bid $11.1 million for the road, but was 
unwilling to increase its offer. After purchasing 
the roadway, John Hancock Financial Services, 
Inc. immediately closed the road to all traffic. 
This move forced TxDOT to pay the private 
company $20 million to purchase the road, 
allowing it to finally reopen the route after five 
months. 
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Project Code J 
Project Name Golden Ears Bridge 
Location British Columbia, Canada 
Estimated construction cost ($ million) US$808 
Final construction cost ($ million) US$808 
Estimated construction schedule June 1st, 2006 – June 30th, 2009 
Final construction schedule June 1st, 2006 – June 9th, 2009 
Project characteristics 
Consisting of approximately 40 lane-
km (24.85 lane miles) of grade-
supported roadway and 20 lane-km 
(12.42 lane miles) of roadway on 
bridge structures 
Lane miles 37.5 
Cost per lane mile (US$ million/mile) 21.55 
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Project Code K 
Project Name Confederation Bridge 
Location PEI, Canada 
Estimated construction cost ($ million) US$840 
Final construction cost ($ million) US$840* 
Estimated construction schedule Oct 7th, 1993 - May 31st, 1997 
Final construction schedule Oct 7th, 1993 - May 31st, 1997 
Project characteristics 
Spanning the Northumberland 
Strait at a length of 12.9 kms (8 
miles) it is the longest bridge of 
its kind in the world 
Lane miles 16 
Cost per lane mile (US$ million/mile) 52.50 
Notes 
*Unsubstantiated information 
on cost overrun of US$300 
million in construction which 
could make the final 
construction cost of the project 
to be US$1140 million 
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Project Code L 
Project Name Highway 104 Cobiqued Pass 
Location Nova Scotia, Canada 
Estimated construction cost ($ million) US$112.9  
Final construction cost ($ million) US$112.9  
Estimated construction schedule March 1st, 1996 - Nov 15th, 1997 
Final construction schedule March 1st, 1996 - Nov 15th, 1997 
Project characteristics 
45 kms (27.96 miles) between 
Masstown and Thomson - Twinned, 
four lanes. Wide median: 22.6 
metres. 18 kms (14 miles) of access 
roads. Five full interchanges. 21 
bridges including river crossings. 
Five lateral access tunnels. 
Lane miles 111.84 
Cost per lane mile (US$ million/mile) 1.01 
 
